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Abstract 
We examine the impact of house prices on labour supply decisions using UK micro 
data. We combine household survey data with local level house price measures and 
controls for local labour demand. Our micro data also allows us to control for 
individual level income expectations. We find significant house price effects on 
labour supply, consistent with leisure being a normal good. Labour supply responses 
to house prices are concentrated among young married female owners and older 
owners. This finding suggests house prices affect the decisions of marginal workers 
in the economy. Our estimates imply house prices are economically important for the 
participation decisions for these workers.  
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HOUSE PRICES, WEALTH EFFECTS AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the course of the past decade many developed economies experienced sustained 
house price increases in the run up to the Great Recession, followed by a period of rapid house 
price decline. These housing market ‘booms’ and ‘busts’ were particularly pronounced in the 
United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In these economies most households are 
homeowners and housing is the largest single investment for these households. On paper, 
movements in house prices generate large changes in wealth on household balance sheets. 
Do these changes in house prices matter for household behaviour? Recent studies have 
confirmed that house prices are important for a range of household activity and behaviour. 
Several studies based on US and UK micro-data have shown that changes in housing wealth 
affect consumption spending and household indebtedness, both by changing life-cycle wealth 
and through relaxing and tightening borrowing constraints1. Other studies have found that house 
prices have significant effects upon educational choices (Lovenheim, 2011; Lovenheim and 
Reynolds, 2013) rates of childbirth (Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013; Dettling and Kearney, 
2014), demand for long-term care insurance (Davidoff, 2010) and divorce (Farnham et al., 
2011). 
Do house prices also matter for labour supply decisions? In this paper we estimate the 
size of housing wealth effects on labour supply for a panel of households in the United Kingdom 
(UK). Our results show that labour supply responses to changes in housing wealth are highly 
heterogeneous across household types. We find small average effects of house prices on labour 
supply choices, but large effects for subsets of households. The household types that show 
                                                          
1  Recent studies on the impact of house prices upon household consumption and saving include Campbell and 
Cocco (2007), Disney, Gathergood and Henley (2010), Attanasio, Leicester and Wakefield (2011), Carroll, Otsuka 
and Slacalek (2011), Browning, Gørtz, and Leth-Petersen (2013), Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013), Cooper (2013); on 
indebtedness see Hurst and Stafford (2004), Disney and Gathergood (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2011).  
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significant responses to housing wealth changes are those at the margins of labour supply: 
married women, at the intra-temporal margin of household labour supply; and men close to 
retirement at the inter-temporal margin of lifetime labour supply. The prior literature shows 
these households are responsive to changes in marginal tax rates. We show wealth effects are 
also important for understanding the labour supply decisions of these groups.  
The effects we find are economically significant. For example, we find that a 10% rise in 
local house prices relative to the national trends is associated with a reduction in the labour 
market participation rate among young married / co-habiting women of 1.8% and a reduction in 
the participation rate among older men of approximately 4.4%. Therefore, our results show that 
house price changes have distributional effects on labour supply (as well as consumption) which 
correlate with life-cycle characteristics. Hence there is a life-cycle as well as an overall effect of 
house price changes on labour supply. 
Why do house prices also matter for labour supply decisions? Basic economic theory 
tells us that increases in non-labour income or wealth raise consumption of normal goods. 
Leisure, like consumption, is typically thought of as a normal good so we might expect housing 
wealth gains to increase leisure and decrease labour supply for some home-owning households, 
and vice versa, for housing wealth losses. Furthermore, studies based on micro data typically 
find the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth is small. One reason 
for this finding might be that, for some types of households, housing wealth changes primarily 
affect labour supply – for example, the decision to retire of older workers – rather than 
consumption. Hence, housing wealth gains might cause some households to reduce income as 
they take more leisure, instead of increasing consumption for an unchanged income and labour 
supply. 
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Existing studies of wealth effects on labour supply exploit exogenous wealth changes 
such as lottery wins (Imbens et al., 2001; Cesarini et al., 2013) and inheritances (Joulfaian and 
Wilhelm, 1994; Brown et al., 2010). These studies in general confirm the intuition that labour 
supply falls when wealth increases. Studies on United States (US) data have shown that housing 
wealth changes impact on decisions that have implications for labour supply, although these 
studies do not estimate labour supply effects directly. Lovenheim (2011) and Lovenheim and 
Reynolds (2013) show that increases in housing wealth raise college and university enrolments. 
Lovenheim and Mumford (2013) show that housing wealth gains also raise the likelihood of 
home owners choosing to have children. As we explain in the next section, estimating exogenous 
wealth effects in the context of housing wealth raises some tricky modelling issues; hence, the 
present study has perhaps been the first to consider the effect of house prices on labour supply 
choices in detail. However, the results presented here have been broadly confirmed by very 
recent studies for the United States (Milosch, 2016) and Australia (Atalay et al., 2016). 
Prior studies also show that movements in wealth are particularly important at the margin 
of retirement timing. Blundell et al (2014) for the UK, and French and Benson (2011) and Daly, 
Kwok and Hobijn (2009) for the US all argue that asset price declines may be one reason why 
labour supply in the post-2008 recession remained higher than in previous recessions due to 
delayed retirement. However, Coile and Levine (2011) for the US and Disney, et al., (2015) for 
the UK find evidence that local labour market changes dominate asset (wealth) effects in 
explaining patterns of retirement over the business cycle. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our econometric modelling strategy. 
The British Household Panel Survey, which we use to estimate responses to housing wealth for 
various dimensions of labour supply, is described in Section 3. Section 4 describes our 
econometric model. Section 5 describes our main results concerning participation and hours. We 
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first estimate effects of housing wealth on hour of work and then on participation decisions. 
Where we find that house price gains (losses) lead to reduced (increased) labour market 
participation, we then investigate the types of activities individuals undertake when they 
withdraw from the labour market – including time away from work to care for children, and 
retirement. We discuss our findings and the economic implications of house price movements 
for labour supply patterns observed during the recent recession. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Modelling strategy 
Our modelling strategy is predicated on the observation that house price movements are 
not randomly assigned across localities and households, and are likely to correlate with local 
economic conditions as well as other factors that influence labour supply decisions. Typically, 
too, observed house values arise endogenously with lifetime choices of a household. An 
important issue in this context is that wealth effects on labour supply should be identified only 
off exogenous shocks. In the canonical life cycle model, consumption, wealth accumulation 
(including housing wealth), and labour supply are simultaneously determined.  Households may, 
for example, work more in order to acquire a more expensive house.  
Households are likely to anticipate that their existing stock of housing wealth may grow 
in value over time due to the overall relative growth in the price of housing, and understand that 
house prices are broadly pro-cyclical in nature. Figure 1 illustrates this pro-cyclicality of house 
prices in the UK using de-trended data. House prices are strongly pro-cyclical and more variable 
than GDP. The correlation coefficient between house prices and GDP is 0.6 over the whole 
period, which includes many business cycle fluctuations2. Hence it is reasonable to assume that 
                                                          
2 The figure plots the percentage deviation from trend for UK real house prices and real GDP. House prices are 
more volatile than GDP. The percentage standard deviation from trend in house prices expressed as a percentage of 
the percentage standard deviation in trend in GDP is 376%.  
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households understand the trend and cyclicality of house prices. Modelling the ‘exogenous’ 
component of house price changes to households is therefore an important practical issue.3   
It is not possible to randomly assign housing wealth. Therefore, our source of 
identification arises from differential changes in house prices across localities relative to average 
national house price changes controlling for neighbourhood effects and trends (such as local 
amenities which may affect house price levels in the area) and household preferences. In our 
baseline model we utilize changes in local house price indices conditioned on time, household 
and neighbourhood effects as our measure of exogenous variation in house prices. We adopt an 
instrumental variables strategy, instrumenting self-reported housing wealth using local level 
house prices, as house values may be reported endogenously.  We also control for tenure and 
locality choices.  
In taking this approach, we assume that households form a general expectation of broad 
house price trends (e.g. from discussion in the news media) and that the exogenous component 
of housing wealth changes arises from realised local variations in the rate of change of house 
prices relative to this national trend.4  We believe that it is reasonable to assume that households 
can identify this local component ex post from posted prices by local realtors (‘estate agents’ in 
British parlance) and widely used free online property search engines that provide valuations of 
existing properties. A relaxation of our modelling strategy would be to assume that households 
do not anticipate average fluctuations in house prices over the business cycle.  This is equivalent 
to removing time effects from the model. We see this as an unrealistic approach to how 
households form expectations of house price movements but we nevertheless investigate this 
possibility. We also, as an additional sensitivity test, see whether our estimated labour supply 
responses are robust to using house values self-reported by households in the survey.   
                                                          
3 And is an issue pertinent for other measures of exogenous wealth shocks insofar as inheritances and even lottery 
wins may be anticipated – arguably it is only the timing of such events that is unknown. 
4 For further discussion of issues concerning the modelling of income and house price expectations, see Browning, 
Gørtz, and Leth-Petersen (2013), and Disney, Gathergood and Henley (2010). 
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To examine the effect of asset prices on labour supply, we must also control for variation 
in local labour demand, given the likely covariance of shocks to asset and labour markets which 
might co-determine local house prices and labour supply decisions. We control for local labour 
market conditions by including the local unemployment rate and local median wage rate as 
controls. 
We use an additional identification strategy for our modelling based on estimating the 
response of renters to house prices and comparing this with the response of owners. The 
rationale for including renters is as follows: Owners and renters should respond asymmetrically 
to house prices – increases in which represent gains for owner but losses for renters (through 
higher rental prices or future house purchase cost).5 If we observe owners and renters responding 
symmetrically to house prices then that would suggest that in the data house prices are acting as 
a proxy for uncaptured local economic conditions which affect both owners and renters in the 
same way. This approach to identification has been used extensively in prior studies of housing 
and consumption (Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010; Attanasio et al., 2011) and 
also in studies of other non-consumption outcomes (Lovenheim, 2011; Lovenheim and 
Mumford, 2013; Dettling and Kearney, 2014; Davidoff, 2010). It is equivalent to a difference-in-
difference estimation across owners and renters. 
A particular advantage of our UK panel is that it includes individual-level income 
expectations data. This is important as income expectations may explain a negative correlation 
between housing wealth and labour supply. In inter-temporal models of labour supply higher 
expected future income (arising, for example, from higher expected future wages) might induce 
                                                          
5 This assumes that rents and house prices broadly move in the same direction at the local level, as theory would 
suggest (Gallin, 2008). Using the panel structure of the data we can calculate the year-on-year growth rates in self-
reported house prices and self-reported rents at the local level. Over all waves of our sample period the simple 
correlation in these first-differences is 0.53. The correlation of first-differences over time range between a minimum 
of 0.45 and a maximum of 0.64. Hence we do not observe particular periods of house price changes becoming 
detached from rents. 
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workers to reduce current labour supply. Higher expected future income also increases current 
consumption and raises current housing demand (to smooth housing consumption), hence 
increasing house prices. Elsewhere, we show that failing to control for income expectations 
causes upward bias in the estimated housing-consumption wealth effect (Disney et al., 2010). 
Attanasio et al. (2011) come to a similar conclusion using a calibrated model. In contrast, 
individual-level income expectations data are not available in US household panels covering the 
working age population.6 
Finally, our modelling strategy has to allow for potential endogeneity of housing tenure 
status and also that migration between localities may induce a potential bias into our estimates. 
Suppose that households move to localities where there are increased work opportunities.  Given 
that housing supply is very inelastic (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016), we would expect such 
localities also to exhibit faster rises in house prices relative to the national average.  Hence, 
worker mobility may induce increased measured hours of work or participation probabilities 
which correlate with local house prices increasing above trend.  This ‘migration effect’ will then 
bias the local ‘house price effect’ downwards.  We discuss our strategy for dealing with this 
issue in due course.    
3. Data Sources 
We use United Kingdom (UK) data combining variation in house prices across 
geographic localities with household panel data to estimate exogenous housing wealth effects on 
labour supply - both for total hours and separately at the extensive margin (participation). Our 
primary data set is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  The BHPS is a high-quality 
source of panel data on work activity and is commonly used in studies on labour supply in the 
UK as in, for example, Blundell et al. (2008). The BHPS is an annual survey of each adult 
                                                          
6 The US Health and Retirement Study now incorporates a wide-ranging module of questions on individual 
expectations but the sample is limited to older individuals.   
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member (16 years of age and older) of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 
households, comprising a total of approximately 10,000 individual interviews.  
Major topics covered in the survey are household composition and demographics, 
participation in the labour market, income, wealth and housing. The same individuals have been 
re-interviewed in successive waves and, if they split-off from original households, all adult 
members of their new households have also been interviewed. Children are interviewed once 
they reach the age of 16. The BHPS adopts a following rule such that if a household leaves the 
survey for a reason other than death it is replaced by a similar household. Households who leave 
the survey due to death are replaced with young households. Hence the sample in each cross-
section is representative of the population of the United Kingdom. We use 18 waves of data that 
are available from 1991 to 20097. 
The sample used here is the head of household and spouse or live-in partner only, aged 
18-75. We limit the top age to 75 as 99% of BHPS respondents are retired by that age and our 
interest is in labour market participation and hours of work. We exclude the self-employed as the 
relationship between house prices and self-employment has been considered elsewhere (Hurst 
and Lusardi, 2004, and Disney and Gathergood, 2009). Using the same dataset as this study, 
Disney and Gathergood (2009) show that house price gains raise the likelihood that an individual 
becomes self-employed or starts their own business. However, the accumulation of home equity 
may arise endogenously with the decision to begin a business in the future.  
The labour market status measure in the dataset is a question on the individual’s current 
activity from which they choose one from the following menu of options: self-employed / in 
paid employment / unemployed / retired / family care / full time student / long-term sick or 
disabled / maternity leave / government training scheme / other status. Hours of work are 
                                                          
7 From 2010 onwards the BHPS survey sample was incorporated into a new survey, ‘Understanding Society’. This 
resulted in many changes to the survey, including changes to many of the core variables in our analysis. Hence we 
do not use the Understanding Society sample in this analysis. 
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measured in the data set as the sum of hours normally worked per week plus overtime hours for 
first and second jobs.8 We define an individual as participating in the labour market if they 
report their labour market status as ‘in paid employment’ or ‘unemployed’. This is our measure 
of labour supply at the extensive margin. We define hours of work as the sum of weekly hours 
plus ‘overtime’ hours for all jobs worked by the individual. This is our intensive margin labour 
supply measure. 
The financial expectations measure included in the survey is an individual level answer 
to the question: ‘Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from 
now, will you be better than now / worse than now / about the same?’ Although this question is 
asked only of a short time-frame, it captures changes in the household’s financial expectations 
which might cause changes in labour supply in the current period and is similar to those used in 
consumer confidence indices9.  Also the question is not limited to income but might capture 
other future financial characteristics related to labour supply and housing choices, such as 
anticipated child-rearing expenses. We take answers to this question and code two 1/0 dummy 
variables for ‘positive financial expectations’ and ‘negative financial expectation’ which we 
include in our econometric specification, allowing the labour supply responses of individuals to 
positive and negative expectations to differ in sign and magnitude.  
We also match into the BHPS local house price data.  This approach, which is similar to 
that used by Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013), has two purposes: first, it provides an instrument 
for self-reported house prices reported by owners, second, it allows us to assign a proxy measure 
of the cost of housing for renters for our test of whether local house price changes proxy changes 
in local economic conditions.  
                                                          
8 Individuals who report they are suffering short-term sickness leave from work or are on vacation from work are 
classified by their regular labour market status (employed or self-employed). 
9 For example, the question about future income expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumer sentiment is 
‘During the next 12 months, do you expect your (family) income to be higher or lower than during the past year?’ 
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Our house price data is the recently introduced Land Registry Local Authority level 
index, which reports average sale values for all new and repeat home sales. Throughout we 
adjust all financial variables to 2000 prices using the Retail Prices Index. We also match into the 
BHPS two local authority level variables which capture local labour market conditions: first, 
registry unemployment data provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and second, 
local authority level average earnings derived from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings employer survey.10 
Summary statistics for key variables appear in Table 1. All financial variables are 
adjusted to year 2000 prices. Our dataset comprises approximately 135,000 individual-year 
observations, 56% of which are for men and 77% of which are for married / co-habiting survey 
respondents. The average age of a respondent to the survey is 47.2 years. A little less than 60% 
of the individual-year observations are for workers in employment (this employment rate is 
lower than the 70% in the working age population as our sample includes individuals up to 75 
years of age and in total 26% of our sample are retired at the point of interview). A little more 
than two-thirds of individual-year observations in our sample are for home owners with the 
average house value among owners at £133,000. The second and third columns show summary 
statistics for owners and renters: owners are typically higher-income, more likely to be in work 
(and have a spouse or partner in work) and have more education. 
 
4. Econometric Model 
                                                          
10 Local authority level average earnings from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (named the New Earnings 
Survey pre-1997) is calculated as average full-time monthly pay for all individuals participating in the survey which 
covers a 1% sample of employee jobs in the UK on an annual basis. Earnings data is derived from confidential 
workplace surveys in which employers report wages paid to employees.   
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This section explains in detail our approach to identification and estimation. Our main 
econometric model is a difference-in-differences specification in which the effect of house prices 
on hours of work is estimated by home ownership status. The specification is: 
hilt = α + β1Hlt* Oilt + β2Hlt* Rilt + β3Oilt + β4Ult + β5Elt + β6Xilt  
         + β7Filt +  φi + θl + ψt + εilt        (1) 
Where i denotes an individual, l denotes local authority of residence and t denotes year.  
The (log) of annual hours for all employed individuals with non-zero hours is denoted hilt.  Hilt is 
the local authority house price (the (log) average house price at the local authority level in each 
year). Oilt is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the individual is a home owner and 0 
otherwise. Rilt is the reverse dummy variable denoting whether the individual is a renter. 
Among the set of control variables Ult is the local unemployment rate at the local 
authority level in each year, Elt is (log) average earnings at the local authority level in each year, 
Xilt is a set of individual level socio-economic characteristics and control variables and Filt is the 
individual’s self-reported financial expectation11. Equation 1 also includes local authority fixed 
effects θl, year fixed effects ψt, and time-invariant individual characteristics captured by the 
individual fixed effects φi. 
The BHPS data also contain self-reported house prices for home owners (but not for 
renters). Therefore, we also present an IV-specification in which self-reported prices for home 
owners are instrumented using local authority prices. This specification is: 
hilt = α + β1ĤOilt + β2HRlt + β3Oilt + β4Ult + β5Elt + β6Xilt + β7Filt +  φi + θl + ψt + εilt (2) 
ĤOilt = β1Plt + β4Ult + β5Elt + β6Xilt + β7Filt +  φi + θl + ψt +  ξilt    (3) 
                                                          
11 We model labour supply decisions at the individual level, controlling for the labour market status of an 
individual’s spouse or partner through a set of controls for labour market states. An alternative approach 
beyond the scope of our analysis would be to jointly model labour supply decisions at the household 
level.  
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In this specification ĤOilt is the instrumented self-reported house price for owners, where 
the instrument is the local authority house price Plt (the (log) average house price at the local 
authority level in each year). HRlt is the local authority house price for renters. When using self-
reported prices, we instrument them using local authority level house prices, to control for 
potential endogeneity of self-reported prices to labour supply decisions.  
Household tenure choice and moving activity may not be exogenous and we address this 
in our identification strategy. To interpret the coefficient β1 as representing the causal impact of 
housing wealth on labour supply requires that the estimated impact of local house prices on 
labour supply is not attributable to omitted variable(s) which might drive both house prices and 
labour supply for which house prices might be a proxy. There may be unobserved differences in 
local economic conditions not captured by the covariates included in Equation 1 above.  
To account for these we incorporate renters into our econometric model, adopting an 
approach which has been used extensively in the literature on housing and consumption (for 
example Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010; Attanasio et al., 2011.) The reason for 
this approach is as follows. If renters intend to buy in future then indirect wealth gains and losses 
among renters arising from local house price changes are in the opposite direction to those 
experienced by current owners. Indeed, if house price appreciation is ultimately reflected in 
increased rental prices, renters face increased cost of renting. Thus, conditioning on controls, if 
our house price variable is not proxying for unobserved local economic conditions then renters 
should respond differently to owners in respect to house price changes.  
Hence, if the coefficients β1 and β2 are both non-zero and equal (i.e. the estimated impact 
of local authority house prices on the labour supply of owners and renters is identical) then we 
would conclude that local authority house prices proxy for unobserved local conditions. If they 
are both zero, we would conclude that house prices have no impact on work decisions. If β1 is 
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negative and β2 is either zero or positive, we have identified a negative wealth effect on labour 
supply arising from (changes in) housing wealth. 
This comparison between renters and owners in Equation (1) is equivalent to a 
difference-in-differences model. However, renters and owners have different characteristics, 
shown in Table 1, for example our data show that renters typically have lower household 
income. Incorporating renters into our estimation as a comparison group, however, requires that 
the coefficients on the interaction terms β1 and β2 reflect the differential responses of owners and 
renters to house price gains and losses due to their homeownership status and not due to other 
characteristics which differ between owners and renters (such as age and income). Where 
owners and renters differ in these other characteristics, the coefficients on β1 and β2 might reflect 
the impact of these other characteristics in the relationship between house price and labour 
supply, hence confounding our model.  
Accordingly, in our estimates, and in an extension to equation (1), interaction terms 
between the owner and renter house price variable and all other observable covariates are 
included in the model. To account for the effects of unobservable time-varying differences 
between owners and renters which might locally correlate with house prices and labour supply 
we also incorporate renter-locality time trends and owner-locality time trends into the model 
shown in Equation 2. 
In addition, two sources of selection bias might confound estimates of Equation (1). First, 
local authority-level house price changes are not exogenous for individuals who move local 
authority. Selection bias would occur if individuals moved to higher house price localities and 
simultaneously changed their labour market participation. To eliminate any bias arising from 
moving behaviour we use two strategies.  
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In the first strategy, we exclude cross-local authority movers (dropping approximately 
8.5% of the individual-year observations in our sample). We show the omission of these 
households does not change our results. In the second strategy, we keep cross-local authority 
movers in the sample but calculate the counterfactual house price change (i.e. that they would 
have received had they not moved local authority) and use this simulated change in house prices 
to estimate Equation (1) instead of their actual cross-local authority change. This strategy shows 
very similar results to our baseline estimates.  
Second, selection bias would arise if house price changes caused individuals to change 
from renting to owning and the likelihood of changing tenure were related to labour supply. We 
address this in two ways. First, we use initial homeownership status of the household (i.e. 
homeownership status in the first wave in which the individual is observed) rather than 
contemporaneous housing tenure in our specifications to eliminate housing tenure changes that 
might cause selection bias. Second, we use initial home ownership status as an instrument for 
contemporaneous housing tenure, assuming initial home ownership status is exogenous. We 
show both strategies yield estimates of β1 and β2 which are very similar to those using 
contemporaneous housing status. 
We also run equations at the extensive margin where we estimate the linear probability of 
an individual participating in the labour market. As we use a fixed effects panel estimator we are 
thereby estimating labour market transitions. In similar vein, and corresponding to some of the 
existing literature, we also estimate transition equations into other non-participation labour-
market inactive states, specifically the categories of ‘retirement’ and ‘family care’.   
We estimate all the models using (within) fixed effects estimation and use a linear 
estimator throughout. As the house price variable and unemployment variable are both defined at 
the local authority level we calculate standard errors clustered at the local authority level. We 
have also calculated estimates with standard errors clustered at the region level to allow for 
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wider geographic house price correlation and find very similar results.  Our econometric specific 
also includes generated regressors in the local level covariates, which are themselves estimated, 
hence we also apply a standard bootstrap technique to our econometric estimates. 
5.  Results 
5.1 House Prices and Hours of Work 
We first show results for the impact of house prices on hours of work. Table 2 shows 
estimates for the difference-in-differences hours of work equation (Equation 1) for sub-samples 
of individuals defined by marital status (single or married / co-habiting), gender (male / female) 
and age (less than 40; 40-54; over 54). Only individuals with non-zero hours of work are 
included in the estimation sample. Each column of Panels A and B shows results from a separate 
model where Panel A includes individuals who are married / cohabiting and Panel B includes 
single individuals. Within each panel, results are shown for sub-samples defined by gender and 
the three age categories.  
We report coefficients and standard errors on the house price terms for home owners and 
renters, the local authority unemployment rate and the financial expectations variable.. 
Results in Table 2 show that for all groups other than young married / co-habiting women 
there is no evidence for a statistically significant effect of house prices on hours of work. None 
of the estimated coefficients on either the owner or renter house price interaction terms are 
statistically significant at the 5% level and the p-values from t-tests for equivalence of means 
between the renter and owner coefficients fail to reject the null that coefficients for the two 
groups are the same.  
However, we do find statistically significant results for young married / co-habiting 
women. The coefficient on the home owner house price term is negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level. The coefficient on the renter house price term is positive and 
statistically not significantly different from zero. The p-value from the test for equivalence of 
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coefficients is less than 0.001, implying that these coefficients are significantly different from 
one another at a very high level of confidence.  
The coefficient on the home owner house price term takes a value of -0.176. This implies 
a 10% increase in house prices leads to a reduction in hours for married / co-habiting young 
female home owners of 1.8%. Average (non-zero) annual hours for this group in our sample is 
1,485. Hence a 10% increase in prices reduces annual hours by 27 hours per annum, 
approximately three-quarters of a working week of hours on average for this group. 
For young married / co-habiting women the coefficient on the financial expectations 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This provides some evidence for 
intertemporal substitution of hours of work: individuals with positive expectations about their 
future finances work fewer hours in the current period. The coefficients on the financial 
expectations variable are also negative for young single men and women but in both cases are 
not statistically significant. Our result that the labour supply of young married women is 
responsive to housing wealth is unsurprising – this is the labour market groups typically found to 
operate at the margin of intra-temporal household labour supply.  
Table 3 shows results from a series of robustness specification tests for our results for the 
sample of young married / co-habiting women. There are five alternative specifications in the 
table12. The first two specifications relate to home moving activity. If house price changes 
correlate with labour market changes which induce households to move across local authorities 
then our estimates in Table 2 might suffer selection bias. In the first column individuals who 
move home (approximately 8.8% of the sample) are excluded. In the second column for 
individuals who move local authority we construct a counterfactual house price as the price in 
                                                          
12 We have estimated models for each of these specifications for each of the sub-samples presented in Table 2 (and 
in the remainder of the paper for the labour market participation models). Due to space constraints we do not show 
all estimates in the tables accompanying the paper (the full set of robustness estimates for Table 1 alone sums to 60 
extra models) but instead only show robustness estimates for sub-samples where the main specification returned 
results of interest. The replication files include robustness estimates (and region level cluster standard errors 
estimates which also do not change our main results) for all sub-samples.  
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their former local authority in all waves following their home move (i.e. allocate to that 
individual the future house price as if they had not moved local authority). 
Results show that when movers are excluded from the sample the owner local authority 
house price term remains negative, statistically significant at the 0.1% level and significantly 
different from the (not significant) coefficient on the renter local authority house price term. The 
absolute value of the coefficient is a little larger than in the baseline specification (-1.79 
compared with -1.76), confirming our prior that including movers biases the coefficient estimate 
downwards. When simulated prices are used, the same pattern of statistical significance remains 
by the absolute value of the coefficient falls a little (to -1.73). Overall, therefore, we find no 
evidence for moving activity confounding the main estimates presented in Table 2. 
The next two columns of Table 3 show results from the robustness specifications relating 
to housing tenure and tenure-switching activity. If house price changes induce households to 
change housing tenure and labour supply, then bias will be introduced into our estimates. In the 
first column homeownership status of the individual is fixed to be their home ownership status in 
the first wave in which they are observed in the survey. This is a similar approach to that in 
Column 2 of simulating local authority house prices for movers in that we build a counterfactual 
status for the individual had they not entered into the activity which might confound our 
estimates (moving in the previous case, tenure changing in this case). In the second column ‘IV 
Owner’ this approach is implemented as an Instrumental Variables regression where current 
housing tenure is instrumented using initial housing tenure. Coefficient estimates in both 
columns are quantitatively very similar to the main specification results and show the tenure 
changing activity does not confound our main estimates. 
The final column of Table 3 shows results from a ‘falsification test’ where the one-period 
forward house price is added to the model alongside the contemporaneous house price. A 
significant coefficient on the one-period forward house price might indicate a spurious 
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relationship – future house prices affecting current labour supply – which might be due to 
selection, for example, house prices proxying for household wealth. However, in this 
specification neither of the one-period forward house price terms for owners or renters return 
statistically significant coefficients and the coefficients on the contemporaneous house price 
variable terms are very similar to before. 
Using the self-reported house prices of owners in the data, we also estimate instrumental 
variable difference-in-differences models in which (owner) self-reported house prices are 
instrumented by the local authority house price (following Equations 2 and 3 above). Results are 
shown in Tables A1 – A4, which also report first-stage estimates. Coefficient estimates in these 
models are very similar to those in the non-IV models shown in Tables 2 and 3. Results show 
labour supply responses only among younger married women (the coefficient value is attenuated 
slightly in the IV models), with the coefficients again showing statistically significant 
differences in responses of young female owners compared with young female renters13. 
This finding for young married / co-habiting women may be driven in part by childcare 
related decisions. Labour supply decisions related to childcare needs could potentially be 
affected by house price increases in either direction. For young families seeking to trade-up in 
the housing market in future higher house prices imply higher future housing costs, so we might 
expect labour supply to increase. For those who use paid childcare, higher house prices might 
correlate with childcare costs (if, for example, house prices affect the cost of local childcare 
provision), encouraging substitution away from paid childcare and towards providing childcare 
within the family.  
                                                          
13  These IV models involve self-reported home owner home values instrumented by local 
authority level house prices, entering alongside a local authority level house price interacted for 
renters only (we do not have self-reported prices for renters in the data). An alternative model is 
to use the first-stage model estimated using data on home owners only and predict onto the 
renter sample (as well as the home owner sample). When we use this approach we again find 
very similar results. These results are available from the authors on request.  
 
 
19 
 
To explore whether the effects we find for young married / co-habiting women extend 
beyond those with children we re-estimate the series of models in Table 4 for a sub-sample of 
respondents within the category who either do not have children, or have older children (aged 12 
or over). For these groups childcare needs are reduced or do not exist. Table 4 estimates show 
the coefficient on the instrumented house price for owners is negative and statistically significant 
in these specifications, and slightly larger in absolute magnitude compared with the estimates in 
Table 2. These results show that the labour supply responses of young married women are not 
tied to childcare needs, suggesting instead that the wealth effects of house prices increases alter 
labour supply patterns of second workers, with or without direct opportunity costs of working (in 
the form of the cost of childcare provision). 
Our results from estimates for hours of work show, therefore, that house price gains lead 
to reduced female labour supply among home-owning married or co-habiting couples, including 
those without children. This result is consistent with a model in which house price gains operate 
a wealth effect at the variable margin of adjust of household labour supply, which is typically 
hours of work for the female worker. Later we return to the issue of what form of activity (or 
leisure) females might substitute towards as a result of these wealth effects. 
5.2  House Prices and Labour Market Participation 
Next we present results for decision to work on the extensive margin. Table 5 presents 
estimates from the participation equation, where the labour market participation dummy variable 
takes a value of 1 if the respondent is employment or unemployed, and takes a value of 0 
otherwise. We estimate Linear Probability Models with individual fixed effects plus local 
authority and time effects and renter-local authority plus owner-local authority time trends, 
following the hours of work specification shown earlier. Results are shown by sub-groups using 
the same convention as in Table 2 with sub-groups defined over relationship status, gender and 
age. 
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Results show house price gains decrease the likelihood of participation among young 
married / co-habiting women and among older men (both married and unmarried). For each of 
these sub-samples the coefficient on the owner house price term is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of older single male individuals and at the 0.1% level for older 
married / co-habiting men and young married / co-habiting women. In each case these estimated 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from the renter house price coefficients at the 
0.01% level of significance. The pattern in coefficient estimates also show female participation 
among middle-age and older married / co-habiting women decreases with the unemployment 
rate and participation among most groups decreases with a positive financial expectation, though 
the coefficients on these variables are in each model not statistically significantly different from 
zero. 
The coefficient estimates on the owner house price term for young married / co-habiting 
women is -0.134, which is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Hence at 10% increase in 
house prices causes a 1.3 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of participation for this 
group. The labour market participation rate among this group is 76%, so the 1.3 percentage point 
fall equates to a 1.7% fall in the likelihood of participation against the baseline participation rate. 
The renter house price term is positive but not statistically significant, so we see no evidence of a 
symmetric response among married / co-habiting renters who lose out when house prices 
increase. Results for young single women show no statistically significant effects of house prices 
on the participation decisions of either owners or renters, so the effects we observe for young 
women are specific to married / co-habiting young women only. Below we analyse the labour 
market destinations of this group when they leave the labour force and consider whether this 
withdrawal is likely to be temporary or permanent. 
We find statistically significant effects for older men and women. For the sub-groups of 
older married / co-habiting and single men the coefficient estimates on the owner house price 
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variable are -0.153 and -0.127. These imply 1.5 percentage point and 1.3 percentage point 
reductions in the likelihood of participation into response to a 10% increase in house prices. 
Evaluated against the baseline participation rates for these groups (which are 36% and 25% 
respectively) these magnitudes imply that a 10% increase in house prices causes a 4.2% and 
5.2% decrease in likelihood of participation. The coefficient estimates are statistically 
significantly different from the renter house price coefficients at the 0.01% level in both cases. 
For older married and single women the coefficients are -0.0436 and -0.0477 (in the latter case 
statistically significant at only the 10% level), which to translate to less than a 3% decrease in 
likelihood of participation. Later we discuss these differences in effect sizes across older men 
and women. 
Table 6 presents results from our robustness specifications. As in the hours results, here 
we show the robustness estimates for sub-samples of for which the main results returned 
statistically significant results for the owner house price coefficient (young married / co-habiting 
women, older married and single men). Results show very similar coefficient estimate on the 
house price variables for the first four columns which examine sensitivity to home moving and 
home tenure. As with the hours estimates, excluding movers causes the absolute value of the 
coefficient to increase confirming that moving activity biases the main result downwards. The 
specifications for tenure changes return very similar estimates to the main results. For each sub-
sample the ‘forward prices’ falsification test yields no evidence of labour market participation 
responding to forward house price movements. On this basis, we are confident that our main 
estimates are robust to moving activity and home tenure. 
5.3 Labour Market Destinations  
The results for labour market participation show labour supply elasticities with respect to 
house prices are significant and large for young married women and older men. These effects are 
consistent with labour supply adjustment by marginal workers located at the margins of family 
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labour supply (young married / co-habiting women) and lifetime labour supply (older married / 
cohabiting men and older single men). In this section, we explore these transitions further 
through analysis of the labour market destinations of these groups induced into leaving the 
labour force in response to house price gains. 
We might expect that the withdrawal of young married / co-habiting women is temporary 
due to career breaks for children. Recent studies based on U.S. data have also found that house 
price increases raise the likelihood of couples having children (Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013).  
They do not examine the labour market consequences of this. Most women undertake some form 
of ‘maternity leave’ or other leave following childbirth. In our data we have information on the 
main activity of non-working individuals so we can estimate whether house price gains induce 
this form of activity for young women. To do so, we estimate our labour supply equation in 
which the dependent variable is a 1/0 dummy for whether a woman undertakes ‘family care’ 
activity (instead of working). We construct this measure from the survey question on labour 
market activity described earlier. 
Results from these estimates are shown in Table 7. For completeness we estimate models 
for four subgroups: young and middle-age married women plus young and middle-age single 
women. Estimates for single women yield no statistically significant coefficients for either the 
owner house price or renter house price terms. Estimates for married / co-habiting women return 
a positive coefficient of 0.0912 for young women and 0.0474 for middle-age women, though the 
latter is statistically significant only at the 5% level. In both cases the owner house price 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from the renter house price coefficients. The 
renter house price coefficient for young married women is negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% level, providing some evidence that house price gains decrease the likelihood of 
leaving the labour force to care for children among young married / co-habiting women renters.  
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The coefficient estimates imply large proportional effects of house price gains upon the 
likelihood of leaving the labour force to undertake family care activity. The baseline family care 
rate among young married home owning women is 18%, hence the impact of a 10% increase in 
house prices is to raise he likelihood of family care among this group by on average 5%. For 
middle-age married women the baseline rate is 13% and implied effect of a 10% increase in 
house prices is 3.9%. We present robustness results in appendix table A5. These results show 
alternative specifications for moving activity and tenure yield very similar results to the main 
specification. 
Finally, we present estimates of the effect of house prices on retirement decisions for 
older men. We again modify the labour supply equation with the dependent variable replaced 
with to a 1/0 indicator for whether the individual is retired. We define retirement as permanent 
exit from working and check our data to exclude observations for individuals who report 
themselves as retired in (at least) one wave but subsequently re-enter the labour market.   
In Table 8 we report estimates for a sub-samples of older men and women, married and 
single. Results for women indicate no statistically significant coefficients on either the owner or 
renter house price terms. Results for men show statistically significant coefficients on the owner 
house price terms for both married and single men. The coefficient values of 0.115 and 0.120 
imply a 10% increase in house prices raises the likelihood of retirement among men by 1.1 
percentage points and 1.2 percentage points respectively for each group. Baseline retirement 
rates for these groups are 43% for male married and 34% for male singles. Hence a 10% increase 
in prices causes a 1.9% increase in the likelihood of retirement for male married and a 4.2% 
increase for male singles. Results from robustness specifications shown in appendix Table A6 
confirm very similar coefficient estimates from the alternative specifications. 
5.4 Discussion 
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Our results shows heterogeneous labour supply responses to house prices by housing 
tenure, gender, age and marital status. There is little evidence that participation or hours of work 
among middle-aged home owners are responsive to house price movements, but strong effects 
are found for younger married female owners and for older married and single owners. These 
effects are consistent with labour supply adjustment by marginal workers at the margins of 
family labour supply (young women) and lifetime labour supply (older men). The economic 
reasons for these effects may be different, however.  
The response of labour supply of young female owners to housing wealth gains might 
arise through two routes: either through the effect of having young children (since a wealth gain 
to the household may allow a young married women to reduce hours, or at least to delay the 
return to full time work after the birth of a child, and house prices may correlate with child care 
costs), or through alleviating borrowing constraints in the upswing. Table 7 suggests that rising 
house prices are indeed associated with an increased propensity for the wife or co-habiting 
partner to be engaged in full-time child care. Any correlation between child care costs and house 
prices might be a potential explanation of this result. However, Table 4 suggests that married 
women without children are also affected by house price changes. Hence child care costs do not 
seem to be the reason for the observed result and child care is not the explanation for the result 
among childless couples. This suggests that other factors are also at work. 
Although house price increases for young owners are unlikely to represent significant 
lifetime net wealth gains as young owners typically trade-up to larger houses in future (the price 
of which also increase with general house price increases), house price gains may loosen 
borrowing constraints and this may impact on labour supply decisions. This is only likely under 
certain circumstances: for example in the upswing rather than during a general reduction in 
house prices, and where the trade-up is not disproportionately large. However, Cooper (2013) 
shows that among US households, the main route by which house price gains influence 
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consumption is through loosening borrowing constraints; a result reinforcing the 
disproportionate response of consumption to house price changes among ‘collateral-constrained’ 
households shown by Disney and Gatherood (2011). Our present results suggest this is 
potentially true also for labour supply among young UK households.  
House price gains allow owners who were previously borrowing constrained to extract 
home equity (e.g. through a larger mortgage) or to reduce mortgage financing costs by 
refinancing to a mortgage with a lower interest rate previously unavailable due to leverage 
constraints. Among young households labour supply effects are associated with having children; 
an activity which may have been postponed by households until borrowing constraints relaxed.   
The response of older male owners (and, less strongly, among older married women) 
appears consistent with a pure life-cycle wealth effect. Older male owners towards the end of 
their mortgage amortization are unlikely to be borrowing constrained. Instead, they are more 
likely to be holding above lifetime-average housing which they intend to downsize after 
retirement. For these households, house price gains represent pure wealth gains and we can 
interpret the labour supply response as a pure wealth response similar to the effect of a lottery 
win or inheritance.  Typically, however, older workers tend to reduce labour supply discretely at 
later ages, either by full retirement or by retiring from a full-time job and switching to part-time 
work. Hence, we expect a stronger effect on the participation margin than on hours of work 
conditional on retaining the same job. The result may be less strong for married women because 
many married women in these cohorts have been working part-time for much of their lifetime 
and hence do not consider ‘retirement’ as a discrete labour market decision (Table 8)14. 
                                                          
14  An alternative viewpoint is that is that older female workers, who typically work part-time, have higher 
opportunity costs of working. Older female workers are more likely to be a valuable source of childcare for 
grandchildren, and are less likely to be attached to forms of employment which carry seniority wages due to their 
lower lifetime attachment to the labour force.  
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Our results have implications for the business-cycle dynamics of labour supply for the 
groups of individuals who respond to house price changes. House prices are pro-cyclical and 
therefore our results suggest housing wealth gains are a pro-cyclical driver of leisure (for those 
older men who retire), or family care (for those younger married / co-habiting women who leave 
the labour force), in contrast to wages which are a pro-cyclical driver of wealth. However, the 
specifications we estimate include time dummies to capture time specific ‘macroeconomic’ 
effects. This means our estimates for labour supply effects of house price movements are net of 
national movements in prices (and identified off local variation against the national trend).  
The inclusion of time dummies is necessary for identification, but doing so does not 
allow us to use our coefficient estimates to calculate the business cycle effects of house price 
movements upon labour supply. Therefore we re-estimate the models shown in the previous 
section and exclude time dummies so that a business cycle interpretation can be applied to the 
estimated coefficients. We do this for the extensive margin estimates for young married women 
and older men. For young married women the coefficient value in the specification including 
time dummies (Table 4) was -0.132. Removing the time dummies results in a coefficient value 
of -0.138, also statistically significant at the 1% level. For older married men the coefficient in 
the model without time dummies is -0.146 (compared with -0.149 in the model without 
dummies) and -0.139 (compared with -0.134).  
Why do these coefficient estimates move very little when the time dummies are 
removed? We should expect that labour supply dynamics have a strong aggregate level 
component. However, analysis of the coefficient on the unemployment variable provides an 
answer. With the removal of the time dummies the coefficient on the unemployment variable 
becomes statistically significant (at the 1% level) in each of these specifications and takes a 
negative value. Hence time variation in labour supply patterns is mostly captured by local 
unemployment rates, which can be seen as a measure of local macroeconomic conditions. We 
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now use these estimates to calculate the implied aggregate effects of house prices and local 
unemployment conditions upon labour market participation during the recent recession. Our 
estimates imply housing wealth effects have a strong influence of labour supply over the 
business cycle compared with local labour market conditions and can explain a large share of 
labour supply movements during the recent recession.  
Our calculations here can only be considered as illustrations of the importance of housing 
wealth effects. The coefficient estimates from models without time dummies imply that a 10% 
increase in house prices lower the labour supply rate among young married women by 1.5pp, 
among older married / co-habiting men by 1.6pp and among older single men by 1.3pp. We 
evaluate these estimated effects against changes in house prices and labour supply during the 
recent UK recession, the 8-quarter period of persistent decline in GDP beginning in the first 
quarter of 2008 and ending in the first quarter of 2010.  
During this period the sale price of homes purchased by first time buyers fell in real 
terms value by on average 27% (figure derived from the first-time purchaser sales prices in the 
Halifax house price index used in our analysis). The labour market participation rate for young 
women fell from 72.9% to 71.1% (statistics on labour market participation by marital status are 
not available). Our estimates imply the 27% fall in price increased labour supply among young 
married women by 3.8pp. Hence had house prices seen no change, all other things being equal, 
the participation rate among young married women would have fallen to 67.3%, nearly three 
times the observed fall in participation.  
Over the same period the unemployment rate rose by 2.5pp. Our coefficient estimates 
show that for young married / co-habiting owners an increase in unemployment of this 
magnitude leads to a 2.3pp decline in labour market participation. Hence in our estimates the 
wealth effect which encourages labour market participation arising from house price changes 
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more than offsets the effect of labour market conditions captured by the local unemployment rate 
upon labour market participation for this group.  
Equivalent calculations for older men also show our estimates imply economically 
important housing wealth effects during the recent recession. The participation rate of older men 
(using the same definition of age 55 to 75 as we use in our microdata analysis) fell from 40.7% 
in the first quarter of 2008 to 38.7% by the first quarter of 2010. We assume house prices facing 
this group fell in line with the all-sale Halifax index as we do not have a detailed house price 
index for older households. The index shows a 21% fall over the period. The mid-range of our 
coefficient estimates on the owner house price variable for older married / co-habiting and single 
men implies a 10% fall in house prices causes a 1.45pp increase in labour market participation 
rate.  
A 21% fall in house prices therefore implies a 3pp increase in the labour market 
participation rate. Hence without the decrease in house prices, ceteris paribus, the labour market 
participation rate among older men would have fallen to 35.7%. For older men the average 
increase in local authority unemployment rate over the period of 2.5pp implies a 2.1pp decline in 
labour market participation. Therefore, as with young married / co-habiting female owners, the 
effect of house price falls increase labour market participation is larger than the decrease in 
participation arising due to labour market conditions. 
These estimates for the business cycle effects of house price movements upon the labour 
market participation rate of younger married women and older men show that house price gains 
and losses may be economically important for understanding the labour supply dynamics of 
these groups. In particular, ‘wealth effects’ substantially (though not wholly) compensate for the 
effects of labour demand fluctuations, as proxied by the unemployment rate, over the business 
cycle. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has presented empirical estimates of the impact of housing wealth on labour 
supply behavior among working-age individuals in the United Kingdom using individual level 
panel data. Results show large responses to housing gains and losses and certain groups which 
are unequally distributed among individuals by housing tenure and age. Changes in housing 
wealth have no significant impact on participation or hours decisions among middle-aged 
homeowners or renters, but decrease the likelihood of working among young married / co-
habiting women and also among older men close to retirement age. 
These results show that that housing wealth impacts on household labour supply behavior 
as well as consumer spending. Consumers partially spend housing wealth gains on both leisure 
and consumption. These results are consistent with standard models in which consumption and 
labour supply are jointly determined as households evaluate the marginal utility of consumption 
alongside the marginal utility of leisure. However, our results show labour supply responses 
across groups are not solely attributable to pure life-cycle wealth effects whereby older 
individuals ‘win’ and younger individuals ‘lose’ but instead reflect down-payment or liquidity 
constraint effects which drive labour supply responses of younger individuals. Our results are 
also of economic significance for understanding the business cycle dynamics of labour supply 
for those groups that respond to house price movements.  
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Figure shows percentage deviation from trend for UK real house prices (Halifax quarterly standardized house price 
index, seasonally adjusted, Q1 1975 – Q2 2012) and Real Gross Domestic Product (chain weighted measure, ONS 
coded ABMI, Q1 1975 – Q2 2012). Deviations from trend are calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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Figure 1: Business Cycle Dynamics of House Prices and GDP in the UK, 1975-2012 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for BHPS Sample Demographic  
and Socio-Economic Characteristics 
 
Demographics 
(1) All (2) Owners (3) Renters 
N 135,380 100,224 35,156 
Age (years) 47.2 
(14.62) 
42.3 
(13.79) 
44.3 
(16.4) 
Male=1 0.56 
(0.50) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
.059 
(0.50) 
Racial Minority=1 0.13 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
Married / Co-Habiting=1 0.77 
(0.42) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
Divorced=1 0.08 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
Children age 0-6=1 0.12 
(0.33) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
Children age 7-16=1 0.22 
(0.42) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
Highest Educational 
Qualification 
   
Degree=1 0.13 
(0.33) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
A-levels=1 0.16 
(0.37) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
O-levels=1 0.29 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.46) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Current Employment Status    
Employed=1 0.59 
(0.60) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
Unemployed=1 0.03 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
Retired=1 0.26 
(0.80) 
0.27 
(0.40) 
0.26 
(0.39) 
Spouse / Partner Employed=1 0.41 
(0.41) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.24 
(0.42) 
Household Annual Income £33,500 
(£18,648) 
£42,700 
(£32,100) 
£29,400 
(£18,600) 
Housing Status and House Value    
Owner=1 0.78 
(0.44) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Renter=1 0.22 
(0.15) 
0.00 
(0.00 
1.00 
(0.00) 
House Value (£, owners,) £133,000 
(£128,000) 
- - 
Mortgage Value (£, if value > 0) £53,900 
(£45,600) 
- - 
Notes: mean values with standard deviation in brackets 
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Table 2 Estimates for Relationship Between Log Local House Prices and Log Hours of Work 
for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 
 Panel A: Individuals in Married or Co-Habiting Couples 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) log hp - owner -0.176*** -0.0118 0.0534 0.0456 0.0284 -0.00800 
 (0.0282) (0.0307) (0.0747) (0.0323) (0.0301) (0.0409) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00510 -0.00385 0.00146 -0.00786 -0.00173 -0.0101 
 (0.00492) (0.00390) (0.0108) (0.00542) (0.00355) (0.00622) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0388 -0.00242 0.247 -0.0484 -0.0959 -0.160 
 (0.0679) (0.0600) (0.196) (0.0771) (0.0569) (0.0853) 
(4) financial expectation -0.327* -0.125 0.638 -0.309 0.108 -0.279 
 (0.142) (0.133) (0.458) (0.158) (0.113) (0.215) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.2223 0.6076 0.4366 0.6230 0.2024 
N 12727 12597 3636 12266 11384 4089 
       
 Panel B: Single Individuals 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) log hp - owner -0.0267 -0.00280 -1.362 0.0524 -0.0651 -0.512 
 (0.0449) (0.0296) (1.551) (0.0846) (0.0718) (3.702) 
(2) log hp - renter -0.000655 0.00372 -1.332 -0.0308 0.00143 -0.0628 
 (0.00608) (0.00358) (1.441) (0.0192) (0.00410) (0.438) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.227 -0.0667 0.0912 -0.335 -0.00331 0.689 
 (0.124) (0.0583) (0.301) (0.230) (0.0524) (7.193) 
(4) financial expectation -0.151 0.0467 0.619 -0.138 -0.125 3.615 
 (0.245) -0.00280 (1.382) (0.481) (0.129) (25.01) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.6589 0.7180 0.8513 0.3165 0.0933 0.9398 
N 3747 3064 1098 2620 1778 582 
Dependent variable: Natural log of hours of work for sample of individuals with non-zero hours. Sample: Head of 
household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Self-reported house price for 
owners is instrumented using local authority log local authority mean house price. Additional control variables not 
shown in table: age, age squared; educational dummies for highest educational achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, 
degree (or equivalents)); marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), number of children, health status 
(self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual 
non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-
local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in 
parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of coefficients in rows (1) and (2). 
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Table 3 Robustness Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Log Hours of Work for 
Women in Married or Co-Habiting Couples. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates.  
 (1) 
Excluding 
Movers 
(2) 
Simulated 
Prices 
(3) 
Initial Owner 
(4) 
IV Owner 
(5) 
Forward Prices 
      
(1) log hp - owner -0.179*** -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.173*** -0.174*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0346) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00253 0.00246 0.00286 0.00257 0.00578 
 (0.00346) (0.00357) (0.00435) (0.00496) (0.0074) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0095 
     (0.0288) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - -0.0349 
     (0.0287) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.4916 
N 11206 12727 12727 12727 11161 
 
Dependent variable: Natural log of hours of work for sample of individuals with non-zero hours. Sample: Head of 
household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Self-reported house price for 
owners is instrumented using local authority log local authority mean house price. Additional control variables not 
shown in table: age, age squared; educational dummies for highest educational achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, 
degree (or equivalents)); marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), number of children, health status 
(self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual 
non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-
local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in 
parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of coefficients in rows (1) and (2); (3) and (4).  
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Table 4 Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Log Hours of Work for Women 
in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Without Children, Or With Children Aged 12 or Over. 
Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 (1) 
Excluding 
Movers 
(2) 
Simulated 
Prices 
(3) 
Initial 
Owner 
(4) 
IV Owner 
(5) 
Forward 
Prices 
      
(1) log hp - owner -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.141*** -0.150*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0208) (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0264) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00645 0.00335 0.00275 0.00245 0.00424 
 (0.00436) (0.00555) (0.00834) (0.00623) (0.00754) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0057 
     (0.0073) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - -0.00455 
     (0.0374) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.5026 
N 3922 4024 4024 4024 3978 
 
Dependent variable: Natural log of hours of work for sample of individuals with non-zero hours. Sample: Head of 
household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Self-reported house price for 
owners is instrumented using local authority log local authority mean house price. Additional control variables not 
shown in table: age, age squared; educational dummies for highest educational achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, 
degree (or equivalents)); marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), number of children, health status 
(self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual 
non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-
local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in 
parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of coefficients in rows (1) and (2); (3) and (4). 
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Table 5 Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Labour Market Participation 
for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
       
 Panel A: Individuals in Married or Co-Habiting Couples 
 Women Men 
 Age <40 Age 40-54 Age >54 Age <40 Age 40-54 Age >54 
       
(1) log hp - owner -0.134*** -0.0230 -0.0436 -0.00202 0.0143 -0.153*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0238) (0.0225) (0.0159) (0.0187) (0.0234) 
(2) log hp – renter 0.00185 -0.00211 -0.00120 -0.00263 -0.000802 0.00464 
 (0.00595) (0.00380) (0.00467) (0.0252) (0.00293) (0.00465) 
(3) unemployment (%) 0.136 -0.112 -0.280 -0.00461 0.0872 -0.120 
 (0.0783) (0.0579) (0.656) (0.0403) (0.0450) (0.0659) 
(4) financial expectation -0.112 0.0220 -0.00928 -0.0568 -0.00983 -0.0302 
 (0.164) (0.136) (0.234) (0.0806) (0.100) (0.207) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.108 0.074 0.271 0.078 0.098 0.355 
N 0.0000 0.3324 0.1947 0.9990 0.3360 0.0000 
       
 Panel B: Single Individuals 
 Women Men 
 Age <40 Age 40-54 Age >54 Age <40 Age 40-54 Age >54 
       
(1) log hp - owner -0.0106 -0.0512 0.0477 0.0550 0.00666 -0.127** 
 (0.0144) (0.0478) (0.0284) (0.0463) (0.0532) (0.0310) 
(2) log hp – renter 0.00639 -0.000236 0.00523 -0.00189 -0.0229** 0.0884 
 (0.00410) (0.00824) (0.00498) (0.00306) (0.00868) (0.0689) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0289 0.0952 0.0620 0.0796 -0.193 -0.0662 
 (0.136) (0.132) (0.0783) (0.128) (0.141) (0.145) 
(4) financial expectation -0.411 -0.131 0.0264 -0.496 0.295 0.779 
 (0.279) (0.299) (0.301) (0.263) (0.309) (0.437) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.218 0.096 0.258 0.376 0.132 0.280 
N 0.0153 0.2812 0.8785 0.2184 0.5775 0.0148 
 
Dependent variable: 1/0 dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the individual is in full or part-time employment and 
0 otherwise. Sample: Head of household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. 
Self-reported house price for owners is instrumented using local authority log local authority mean house price. 
Additional control variables not shown in table: age, age squared; educational dummies for highest educational 
achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)); marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), 
number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, 
unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year 
dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Cluster (local authority) standard errors in parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of 
coefficients in rows (1) and (2). 
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Table 6 Robustness Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Labour 
Market Participation for Selected Groups. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 Women in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Age <40 
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
(1) log hp - owner -0.142*** -0.137*** -0.132*** -0.135*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0213) (0.0142) (0.0224) (0.0224) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00134 0.00125 0.00174 0.00113 0.00153 
 (0.00506) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.00474) (0.00436) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0261 
     (0.0346) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - 0.00135 
     (0.00405) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.123 0.096 0.094 0.099 0.102 
P-value test (3) = (4) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N - - - - 0.4824 
 Men in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Age >54  
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
(1) log hp - owner -0.156*** -0.148*** -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0235) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0253) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00156 0.00224 0.00223 0.00263 0.00213 
 (0.00446) (0.00406) (0.00453) (0.00452) (0.004t4) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0164 
     (0.0281) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - 0.00231 
     (0.00484) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.357 0.363 0.375 0.353 0.362 
P-value test (3) = (4) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N - - - - 0.6492 
 Single Men Age >54 
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
(1) log hp - owner -0.128** -0.128** -0.125** -0.127** -0.122** 
 (0.0353) (0.0364) (0.0342) (0.0353) (0.0324) 
(2) log hp - renter 0.00225 0.00226 0.00274 0.00223 0.00203 
 (0.00616) (0.00642) (0.0064) (0.00774 (0.0071t 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0219 
     (0.0308) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - 0.00227 
     (0.00746) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.330 0.283 0.279 0.283 0.242 
P-value test (3) = (4) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1524 
N - - - - 2637 
 
Notes: as Table 4 
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Table 7 Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Non-Working Full-Time 
Childcare for Women by Marital Status and Age Group. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 
 
 
Married or Co-Habiting 
 
Single 
 Age<40 Age 40-54 Age <40 Age 40-54 
     
(1) log hp - owner 0.0912*** 0.0474* 0.0750 0.0921 
 (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0957) (0.0858) 
(2) log hp - renter -0.0108* 0.000403 -0.00141 0.00358 
 (0.00523) (0.00350) (0.00346) (0.00664) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0972 0.0605 -0.0594 0.00111 
 (0.0687) (0.0534) (0.115) (0.106) 
(4) financial expectation -0.141 -0.124 0.135 0.275 
 (0.144) (0.125) (0.235) (0.241) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.105 0.031 0.139 0.110 
N 0.0000 0.0299 0.0950 0.0141 
 
Sample: female head of household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. 
Additional control variables: age (in years), age squared (in years), marital status dummies (married, divorced, 
widowed), highest educational achievement dummies (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)), ethnic 
minority group dummy variable, number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment 
dummies (employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local 
authority dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 8 Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Retirement for Older 
Men and Women by Marital Status. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
  
Women 
 
Men 
 Marr Age >54 Single Age >54 Marr Age > 54 Single Age > 54 
     
(1) log hp - owner -0.00111 0.0195 0.115*** 0.120** 
 (0.0287) (0.0318) (0.0259) (0.0488) 
(2) log hp – renter -0.00505 0.00548 -0.00197 -0.00731 
 (0.00594) (0.00677) (0.00522) (0.00804) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.215* -0.0474 -0.0182 -0.0952 
 (0.0836) (0.106) (0.0739) (0.170) 
(4) financial expectation 0.406 -0.172 -0.132 0.457 
 (0.298) (0.409) (0.233) (0.510) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.306 0.350 0.281 0.329 
N 0.8000 0.6461 0.0000 0.0031 
 
Sample: Head of household age over 54 plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. 
Additional control variables: age (in years), age squared (in years), marital status dummies (married, divorced, 
widowed), highest educational achievement dummies (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)), ethnic minority 
group dummy variable, number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies 
(employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority 
dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A1 Instrumental Variable Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Log 
Hours of Work for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group.  
 Individuals in Married or Co-Habiting Couples 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) log Ĥ - owner -0.125*** -0.0113 0.0392 0.0329 0.0201 -0.0153 
 (0.0203) (0.0329) (0.0703) (0.0325) (0.0334) (0.0463) 
(2) log H - renter 0.00514 -0.00129 0.00163 -0.00763 -0.00125 -0.0284 
 (0.00435) (0.00492) (0.0128) (0.00734) (0.00385) (0.0743) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0327 -0.00262 0.262 -0.0425 -0.0463 -0.0407 
 (0.0694) (0.0626) (0.141) (0.0701) (0.0564) (0.0346) 
(4) financial expectation -0.348** -0.139 0.699 -0.336 0.362 -0.216 
 (0.130) (0.101) (0.529) (0.157) (0.147) (0.164) 
(5) age 0.0151** 0.0134** 0.0115** 0.0122** 0.0138** 0.0118** 
 (0.00592) (0.00525) (0.00535) (0.00402) (0.00322) (0.00501) 
(6) age squared -0.00952 
(0.00768) 
-0.00532 
(0.00348) 
-0.00632 
(0.00542) 
-0.00935 
(0.00838) 
-0.00762 
(0.00984) 
-0.00325 
(0.00778) 
(7) degree = 1 0.263** 0.205** 0.266** 0.253** 0.343** 0.225** 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.164) (0.126) (0.154) (0.101) 
(8) alevels = 1 0.165** 0.146** 0.165** 0.164** 0.163** 0.152** 
 (0.061) (0.036) (0.031) (0.023) (0.031) (0.061) 
(9) olevels = 1 0.198** 0.174** 0.194** 0.161** 0.131** 0.1t8** 
 (0.0575) (0.0345) (0.0325) (0.0365) (0.0575) (0.0575) 
(10) local wage rate 2.106 3.295 2.263 2.144 2.823 2.155 
 (1.524) (2.934) (1.643) (1.532) (1.501) (1.554) 
(11) young children = 1 0.265 0.235 0.232 0.258 0.645 0.262 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.233) (0.133) (0.643) (0.173) 
(12) older children = 1 0.409 0.474 0.464 0.453 0.364 0.526 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.423) (0.203) 
(13) spouse employed = 1 0.895** 0.822** 0.801** 0.893** 0.637** 0.800** 
 (0.286) (0.299) (0.386) (0.234) (0.316) (0.256) 
(14) spouse self-emp = 1 0.971** 0.902** 0.923** 0.984** 0.975** 0.931** 
 (0.392) (0.352) (0.342) (0.345) (0.343) (0.300) 
(15) mortgage debt (£) 0.0111 0.0113 0.0164 0.0143 0.0321 0.0412 
 (0.0308) (0.0245) (0.0547) (0.0648) (0.0377) (0.0508) 
(16) health status (1-5) -0.0877 -0.0834 -0.0467 -0.0747 -0.0857 -0.0787 
 (0.145) (0.164) (0.165) (0.25) (0.146) (0.133) 
(17) smoker = 1 -0.221 -0.275 -0.223 -0.235 -0.283 -0.321 
 (0.244) (0.537) (0.274) (0.224) (0.264) (0.278) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.3256 0.6219 0.4825 0.6735 0.2734 
N 12727 12597 3636 12266 11384 4089 
Dependent variable: Natural log of hours of work for sample of individuals with non-zero hours. Sample: Head of household plus 
spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Self-reported house price for owners is instrumented using local 
authority log local authority mean house price. Additional control variables not shown in table: age, age squared; educational 
dummies for highest educational achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)); marital status dummies (married, 
divorced, widowed), number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, 
unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year dummies, renter-
local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors 
in parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of coefficients in rows (1) and (2). 
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Table A2 First-Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices 
and Log Hours of Work for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group. 
 
 Individuals in Married or Co-Habiting Couples 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) la house price 0.728** 0.682** 0.812** 0.598** 0.682** 0.842** 
 (0.219) (0.184) (0.222) (0.128) (0.219) (0.200) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0425** -0.0523** 0.0428** -0.0453** -0.0455** -0.0409** 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.134) (0.0102) (0.0164) (0.0146) 
(4) financial expectation -0.0243 -0.0432 0.0324 -0.0243 0.0423 -0.0843 
 (0.330) (0.352) (0.352) (0.399) (0.351) (0.623) 
(5) age 0.0134** 0.0124** 0.0163** 0.0146** 0.0155** 0.0134** 
 (0.00408) (0.00566) (0.00532) (0.00434) (0.00632) (0.00501) 
(6) age squared -0.00634 
(0.00354) 
-0.00645 
(0.00337) 
-0.00633 
(0.00654) 
-0.00435 
(0.00436) 
-0.00637 
(0.00964) 
-0.00654 
(0.00678) 
(7) degree = 1 0.266** 0.237** 0.275** 0.436** 0.355** 0.301** 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.105) (0.15) 
(8) alevels = 1 0.163** 0.246** 0.165** 0.152** 0.153** 0.155** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.031) (0.063) (0.041) (0.031) 
(9) olevels = 1 0.0834** 0.0632** 0.0673** 0.628** 0.623** 0.644** 
 (0.0565) (0.0353) (0.0305) (0.0328) (0.0555) (0.0535) 
(10) local wage rate 2.106 3.295 2.263 2.144 2.823 2.155 
 (1.524) (2.934) (1.643) (1.532) (1.501) (1.554) 
(11) young children = 1 0.265 0.235 0.232 0.258 0.645 0.262 
 (0.161) (0.143) (0.237) (0.133) (0.655) (0.173) 
(12) older children = 1 0.419 0.474 0.464 0.456 0.334 0.526 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.425) (0.206) 
(13) spouse employed = 1 0.895** 0.824** 0.801** 0.893** 0.637** 0.800** 
 (0.286) (0.699) (0.386) (0.234) (0.346) (0.256) 
(14) spouse self-emp = 1 0.971** 0.902** 0.923** 0.984** 0.975** 0.931** 
 (0.392) (0.352) (0.342) (0.345) (0.343) (0.300) 
(15) mortgage debt (£) 0.0101 0.0163 0.0144 0.0153 0.0321 0.0432 
 (0.0358) (0.0245) (0.0547) (0.0648) (0.0377) (0.0548) 
(16) health status (1-5) -0.0877 -0.0834 -0.0467 -0.0747 -0.0857 -0.0787 
 (0.145) (0.164) (0.165) (0.25) (0.146) (0.133) 
(17) smoker = 1 -0.221 -0.244 -0.223 -0.235 -0.233 -0.321 
 (0.244) (0.537) (0.274) (0.224) (0.264) (0.278) 
First-stage F statistic 21.04 21.39 20.98 21.77 21.06 21.83 
N 12727 12597 3636 12266 11384 4089 
Notes: First stage estimates for models reported in Table A1. 
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Table A3 Instrumental Variable. Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Log 
Hours of Work for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group.  
 Single Individuals 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) log Ĥ - owner -0.0142 -0.00352 -1.002 0.0509 -0.0635 -0.374 
 (0.0153) (0.0532) (1.235) (0.0834) (0.0719) (3.253) 
(2) log H - renter -0.00234 0.0033 -1.343 -0.0325 0.00183 -0.0673 
 (0.00352) (0.00323) (1.435) (0.0145) (0.0324) (0.434) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.246 -0.0648 0.0932 -0.352 -0.00345 0.664 
 (0.124) (0.0535) (0.374) (0.295) (0.0555) (7.123) 
(4) financial expectation -0.152 0.0467 0.623 -0.294 -0.123 3.735 
 (0.263) -0.00142 (1.353) (0.434) (0.123) (12.06) 
(5) age 0.0141** 0.100* 0.0113** 0.0162** 0.153** 0.0118** 
 (0.00563) (0.00501) (0.00555) (0.00702) (0.00622) (0.00501) 
(6) age squared -0.00937 
(0.00786) 
-0.00632 
(0.00364) 
-0.00662 
(0.00742) 
-0.00835 
(0.00846) 
-0.00453 
(0.00934) 
-0.00325 
(0.00778) 
(7) degree = 1 0.243** 0.245** 0.745* 0.237** 0.363** 0.201** 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.308) (0.156) (0.196) (0.0975) 
(8) alevels = 1 0.167** 0.175** 0.215** 0.185** 0.162** 0.132** 
 (0.0541) (0.0466) (0.0316) (0.0553) (0.0213) (0.041) 
(9) olevels = 1 0.190** 0.144** 0.196** 0.174** 0.151** 0.128** 
 (0.0525) (0.0375) (0.0345) (0.036) (0.0574) (0.0565) 
(10) local wage rate 2.133 3.233 2.633 2.146 2.853 2.255 
 (1.542) (2.963) (1.643) (2.632) (1.522) (1.563) 
(11) young children = 1 0.235 0.245 0.262 0.248 0.665 0.362 
 (0.186) (0.166) (0.263) (0.133) (0.648) (0.168) 
(12) older children = 1 0.423 0.474 0.474 0.434 0.347 0.523 
 (0.433) (0.286) (0.235) (0.265) (0.474) (0.211) 
(13) spouse employed = 1 0.875** 0.833** 0.811** 0.883** 0.677** 0.863** 
 (0.215) (0.289) (0.308) (0.2634) (0.301) (0.264) 
(14) spouse self-emp = 1 0.951** 0.911** 0.944** 0.984** 0.976** 0.831** 
 (0.336) (0.362) (0.385) (0.335) (0.352) (0.340) 
(15) mortgage debt (£) 0.0146 0.0127 0.0134 0.0123 0.0372 0.0422 
 (0.0538) (0.0256) (0.0427) (0.0655) (0.0353) (0.0548) 
(16) health status (1-5) -0.0647 -0.0874 -0.0667 -0.0701 -0.0822 -0.0763 
 (0.135) (0.146) (0.187) (0.251) (0.156) (0.134) 
(17) smoker = 1 -0.221 -0.295 -0.253 -0.252 -0.289 -0.322 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.6738 0.7946 0.8152 0.3732 0.1846 0.8457 
N 3747 3064 1098 2620 1778 582 
Dependent variable: Natural log of hours of work for sample of individuals with non-zero hours. Sample: Head of household 
plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Self-reported house price for owners is 
instrumented using local authority log local authority mean house price. Additional control variables not shown in table: age, 
age squared; educational dummies for highest educational achievement (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)); 
marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse 
employment dummies (employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local 
authority dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** 
p < 0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in parentheses. ‘P-value test’ reports values from test for equivalence of 
coefficients in rows (1) and (2). 
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Table A4 First-Stage Instrumental Variable Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices 
and Log Hours of Work for Women and Men by Marital Status and Age Group. 
 
 Single Individuals 
 Women Men 
 (1) 
Age <40 
(2) 
Age 40-54 
(3) 
Age >54 
(4) 
Age <40 
(5) 
Age 40-54 
(6) 
Age >54 
       
(1) la house price 0.788** 0.695** 0.846** 0.602** 0.681** 0.863** 
 (0.214) (0.163) (0.244) (0.175) (0.217) (0.240) 
(3) unemployment (%) -0.0425** -0.0523** 0.0428** -0.0453** -0.0455** -0.0409** 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.134) (0.0102) (0.0164) (0.0146) 
(4) financial expectation -0.0243 -0.0432 0.0324 -0.0243 0.0423 -0.0843 
 (0.330) (0.352) (0.352) (0.399) (0.351) (0.623) 
(5) age 0.0134** 0.0124** 0.0163** 0.0146** 0.0155** 0.0134** 
 (0.00408) (0.00566) (0.00532) (0.00434) (0.00632) (0.00501) 
(6) age squared -0.00634 
(0.00354) 
-0.00645 
(0.00337) 
-0.00633 
(0.00654) 
-0.00435 
(0.00436) 
-0.00637 
(0.00964) 
-0.00654 
(0.00678) 
(7) degree = 1 0.266** 0.237** 0.275** 0.436** 0.355** 0.301** 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.105) (0.15) 
(8) alevels = 1 0.163** 0.246** 0.165** 0.152** 0.153** 0.155** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.031) (0.063) (0.041) (0.031) 
(9) olevels = 1 0.0834** 0.0632** 0.0673** 0.628** 0.623** 0.644** 
 (0.0565) (0.0353) (0.0305) (0.0328) (0.0555) (0.0535) 
(10) local wage rate 2.106 3.295 2.263 2.144 2.823 2.155 
 (1.524) (2.934) (1.643) (1.532) (1.501) (1.554) 
(11) young children = 1 0.265 0.235 0.232 0.258 0.645 0.262 
 (0.161) (0.143) (0.237) (0.133) (0.655) (0.173) 
(12) older children = 1 0.419 0.474 0.464 0.456 0.334 0.526 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.223) (0.225) (0.425) (0.206) 
(13) spouse employed = 1 0.895** 0.824** 0.801** 0.893** 0.637** 0.800** 
 (0.286) (0.699) (0.386) (0.234) (0.346) (0.256) 
(14) spouse self-emp = 1 0.971** 0.902** 0.923** 0.984** 0.975** 0.931** 
 (0.392) (0.352) (0.342) (0.345) (0.343) (0.300) 
(15) mortgage debt (£) 0.0101 0.0163 0.0144 0.0153 0.0321 0.0432 
 (0.0358) (0.0245) (0.0547) (0.0648) (0.0377) (0.0548) 
(16) health status (1-5) -0.0877 -0.0834 -0.0467 -0.0747 -0.0857 -0.0787 
 (0.145) (0.164) (0.165) (0.25) (0.146) (0.133) 
(17) smoker = 1 -0.221 -0.244 -0.223 -0.235 -0.233 -0.321 
 (0.244) (0.537) (0.274) (0.224) (0.264) (0.278) 
First-stage F statistic 21.06 21.22 21.99 21.25 21.36 21.75 
N 12727 12597 3636 12266 11384 4089 
Notes: First stage estimates for models reported in Table A1. 
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Table A5 Robustness Estimates for Relationship Between Non-Working Full-Time Childcare 
for Married Women by Age Group. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 
 Women in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Age <40 
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
      
(1) log hp - owner 0.0708*** 0.0693*** 0.0801*** 0.0899*** 0.0712*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0214) (0.0265) (0.0284) (0.0207) 
(2) log hp - renter -0.0111* -0.0131* -0.0136* -0.0135* -0.0199* 
 (0.00436) (0.00474) (0.00587) (0.00456) (0.0065) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0435 
     (0.0643) 
(4) log hp – renter t+1 - - - - -0.0167* 
     (0.00723) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.3954 
N 18103 19026 19026 19026 17283 
  
Women in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Age 40-54 
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
      
(1) log hp - owner 0.0408* 0.0411* 0.0416* 0.0401* 0.0463* 
 (0.0263) (0.0222) (0.0315) (0.0258) (0.0273) 
(2) log H - renter 0.00162 0.00163 0.00188 0.00142 0.00186 
 (0.00323) (0.00634) (0.00592) (0.00422) (0.00342) 
(3) log hp – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0463 
     (0.0339) 
(4) log H – renter t+1 - - - - 0.00745 
     (0.00634) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.2845 
N 17891 18775 18775 18775 17238 
Sample: female head of household plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. Additional 
control variables: age (in years), age squared (in years), marital status dummies (married, divorced, widowed), highest 
educational achievement dummies (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)), ethnic minority group dummy 
variable, number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies (employed, 
unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority dummies, year 
dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Cluster 
(local authority) standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A6 Robustness Estimates for Relationship Between Log House Prices and Retirement 
for Older Men by Marital Status. Individual Fixed Effects Estimates. 
 
 Men in Married or Co-Habiting Couples Age > 54 
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
      
(1) log Ĥ – owner 0.845*** 0.952*** 0.839*** 0.899*** 0.902*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0234) (0.0184) (0.0105) (0.0184) 
(2) log H – renter -0.00234 -0.00534 -0.00325 -0.0333 -0.0256 
 (0.0173) (0.00947) (0.00556) (0.0822) (0.0237) 
(3) log Ĥ – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0645 
     (0.0816) 
(4) log H – renter t+1 - - - - -0.00534 
     (0.00845) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.2666 
N 14826 15612 15612 15612 14394 
  
Single Men Age > 54  
 Excluding 
Movers 
Simulated 
Prices 
Initial 
Owner 
IV Owner Forward 
Prices 
      
(1) log Ĥ – owner 0.102** 0.933** 0.845** 0.110** 0.104** 
 (0.0463) (0.0386) (0.0301) (0.0274) (0.0734) 
(2) log H – renter -0.00840 -0.00834 -0.00353 -0.00344 -0.00634 
 (0.00863) (0.00846) (0.00863) (0.00733) (0.00791) 
(3) log Ĥ – owner t+1 - - - - 0.0237 
     (0.0646) 
(4) log H – renter t+1 - - - - -0.0341 
     (0.0637) 
P-value test (1) = (2) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
P-value test (3) = (4) - - - - 0.3956 
N 3015 3462 3462 3462 2839 
Sample: head of household age over 54 plus spouse/partner BHPS 1991-2009. Individual fixed effects estimates. 
Additional control variables: age (in years), age squared (in years), marital status dummies (married, divorced, 
widowed), highest educational achievement dummies (HND, GCSE, A-level, degree (or equivalents)), ethnic minority 
group dummy variable, number of children, health status (self-reported on 1-5 scale), spouse employment dummies 
(employed, unemployed, retired), natural log of annual non-labour income, homeowner dummy, local authority 
dummies, year dummies, renter-local authority and owner-local authority time trends. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. Cluster (local authority) standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
